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The Story Behind a Troubled Relationship
The command relationship between Abraham Lincoln and George B.
McClellan must rank as one of the most troubled civil-military partnerships in
the Civil War, if not in all U.S. military history. The signs of their schism are
among the best remembered bits of Civil War lore: McClellan repeatedly
snubbing his commander-in-chief and privately referring to him with such slurs
as “the original gorilla," Lincoln chiding the ever-cautious general for his
chronic case of “the slows," wondering if he might “borrow" the army if
McClellan was not going to use it. What began with Lincoln appointing the
nation’s seeming star general to command its largest, best-equipped army to date
witnessed months of delay, a failed campaign on the Virginia peninsula, and a
lost opportunity at Antietam, ended with Lincoln cashiering McClellan in late
1862 and McClellan unsuccessfully challenging the president’s re-election in
1864. This is the tempestuous command arrangement Chester G. Hearn
examines in Lincoln and McClellan at War. Hearn has authored more than a
score of titles in Civil War and American military history, including Six Years of
Hell: Harpers Ferry during the Civil War and When the Devil Came Down to
Dixie: Ben Butler in New Orleans. In this latest work, Hearn offers a
workmanlike account of the strained professional relations between Lincoln and
McClellan which defined much of the Union’s early war effort.
After summarizing the antebellum military careers of Lincoln and
McClellan, Hearn takes readers into the early months of the Civil War. After
scoring minor victories in present-day West Virginia, McClellan was called to
Washington in the wake of the Union disaster at Bull Run. Already being styled
“the Young Napoleon" by the press, “Little Mac" set his organizational and
engineering talents to work building up both the newly constituted Army of the
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Potomac and the ever-growing fortifications around the capital. This period,
however, also witnessed the “All Quiet along the Potomac" phase of the Union
war effort, with McClellan’s army sitting idle while the Confederates held their
Manassas defenses unmolested. Here Lincoln’s frustration with McClellan’s
innate cautiousness would begin to mount. Still more of the Young Napoleon’s
personal foibles emerged at this time, including his penchants for imagining that
he was outnumbered by ridiculously vast Confederate forces and that he himself
was beset everywhere by scheming political enemies in Washington. While
McClellan dithered, he and Lincoln found themselves increasingly at odds over
military strategy, Lincoln favoring using the Chesapeake to turn the Rebel
position at Manassas while McClellan favored taking his army further down the
Chesapeake to launch a westward drive on Richmond. As Hearn correctly
observes, McClellan never let go of his contempt for the president’s military
abilities, ignoring Lincoln’s self-taught crash course in military science and his
innate strategic common sense.
McClellan got his way, steaming his Army of the Potomac south for an
approach to Richmond between the James and York Rivers. After allowing
himself to be stalled besieging a much smaller Confederate force at Yorktown,
McClellan marched up the peninsula, tantalizingly close to the Confederate
capital. However, a series of bold counterattacks by Robert E. Lee intimidated
McClellan into retreating back down the peninsula, even though his larger army
managed to repulse most of Lee’s assaults. McClellan dashed off increasingly
dire dispatches seeking more and more reinforcements, particularly those
Lincoln kept on the overland approach to Richmond in order to safeguard
Washington. McClellan and his army returned north to deal with Lee’s invasion
of Maryland, culminating in the war’s bloodiest one-day battle at Antietam.
There McClellan’s piecemeal attacks failed to destroy Lee’s army, although
Lee’s retreat provided Lincoln enough of a Union triumph to announce his
Emancipation Proclamation. Possibly motivated by his intense opposition to
Lincoln’s new policy, McClellan dragged his feet in pursuit of Lee, ultimately
requiring Lincoln to relieve him of command in November 1862.
Hearn is notably even-handed in his assessment of the president and his
slow-footed eastern general. He praises Lincoln for his remarkable patience and
professionalism in dealing with McClellan’s delays and personal snubs, taking
an intellectual, statesmanlike approach to matters which McClellan met with
emotion and pettiness. On the other hand, Lincoln may have been too
deferential, Hearn suggests, specifically criticizing the commander-in-chief for
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green-lighting McClellan’s peninsula strategy over his own misgivings. While a
strong case could be made that Lincoln should have taken a firmer hand with
McClellan, this case seems an odd example to cite, considering Hearn’s own
testimony suggests that a general more confident and aggressive than McClellan
could have made a success of the Peninsula Campaign. Curiously, Hearn also
seems to pull his punches in assessing McClellan. To critics’ charges that he was
“hesitant and indecisive," he allows that “Little Mac was a certainly a little of
each, but one must not forget the president’s interference," concluding, “Both
were novices, and novices make mistakes" (205). This may be a case of Hearn
simply soft-pedaling his critique of Little Mac. Without explicitly harping on
McClellan’s faults, Hearn’s narrative presents a general not only hesitant,
indecisive, haughty, and petty, but also given to fantastically overestimating the
size of enemy forces and deliberately misleading the administration with
erroneously low counts of his own troop strength.
Much of the subject matter in Lincoln and McClellan at War is well known
to students of the Civil War, but to Hearn’s credit he uncovers some lesser
known details and episodes. For instance, detective Allan Pinkerton’s role in
providing overestimates of Confederate numbers is well known, but Hearn
demonstrates that McClellan was already doing his own overestimating even
before acquiring Pinkerton’s services and furthermore that he generously
rounded up Pinkerton’s own intelligence estimates in his reports to Washington.
Hearn also recounts Lincoln’s 1862 visit to McClellan’s base on the peninsula,
which notably featured the frustrated president taking military matters into his
own hands and masterminding a small expedition that successfully captured
Norfolk.
Excellent prose and solid research make Hearn’s Lincoln and McClellan at 
War a readable and useful addition to Civil War libraries. Furthering developing 
the analysis would have made this volume even better. Hearn offers some 
fascinating speculation regarding whether McClellan’s intense opposition to 
emancipation sapped his will to aggressively pursue Lee after the Battle of 
Antietam but does not fully develop this suggestion. Similarly, Hearn touches on 
the contrasting strategic visions of Lincoln and McClellan—Lincoln favoring the 
destruction of Rebel armies and McClellan pursuing a limited war of 
maneuver—but does not elaborate as much as he might have. An epilogue would 
have been an excellent place to pursue these themes further, but unfortunately 
Hearn ends the narrative with the 1864 election without providing much 
retrospective commentary. The book itself is adequately illustrated with maps of
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Yorktown, the Peninsula Campaign, South Mountain, and Antietam, although a
general map of early war Virginia would have proved a useful addition,
considering the significance of the strategic debates between Lincoln and
McClellan. That said, Chester Hearn in Lincoln and McClellan at War offers a
useful and enjoyable exploration of one of the most strained command
relationships of the Civil War.
Jonathan M. Steplyk is a doctoral candidate in History at Texas Christian
University, specializing in soldier life, the experience of combat, and historical
memory of the Civil War. He is currently preparing a chapter on the Battle of
Franklin for an edited anthology on the 1864 Nashville Campaign.
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